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Interpersonal coordination is a key factor in team performance. In interactive team
sports, the limited predictability of a constantly changing context makes coordination
challenging. Approaches that highlight the support provided by environmental
information and theories of shared mental models provide potential explanations of how
interpersonal coordination can nonetheless be established. In this article, we first outline
the main assumptions of these approaches and consider criticisms that have been raised
with regard to each. The aim of this article is to define a theoretical perspective that
integrates the coordination mechanisms of the two approaches. In doing so, we borrow
from a theoretical outline of group action. According to this outline, group action based
on a priori shared mental models is an example of how interpersonal coordination is
established from the top down. Interpersonal coordination in reaction to the perception of
affordances represents the bottom-up component of group action. Both components are
inextricably involved in the coordination of interactive sports teams. We further elaborate
on the theoretical outline to integrate a third, constructivist approach. Integrating this
third approach helps to explain interpersonal coordination in game situations for which
no shared mental models are established and game situations that remain ambiguous in
terms of perceived affordances. The article describes how hierarchical, sequential, and
complex dimensions of action organization are important aspects of this constructivist
perspective and how mental models may be involved. A basketball example is used to
illustrate how top-down, bottom-up and constructivist processes may be simultaneously
involved in enabling interpersonal coordination. Finally, we present the implications for
research and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Interpersonal coordination is of primary relevance whenever sports teams perform interactively.
The term “coordination” refers to the dynamic arrangement of contributing units to achieve a larger
function (Gorman, 2014) and includes the organizing of team members’ interdependent actions in
regard to sequence and timing (McEwan and Beauchamp, 2014; see also Salas et al., 1995; Marks
et al., 2001; Rousseau et al., 2006; Eccles and Tran, 2012). When teams succeed in coordinating
their aggregated resources effectively, they can optimize the parameters that are relevant to their
performance. One example of this is an enhanced area coverage in defensive football situations.
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Another example is the optimized distribution of team network
nodes, which improves passing opportunities for the members
of a team. In practice situations, interpersonal coordination
can be established through centralized monitoring by a coach
who provides external feedback in real time (Seiler, 2014). This
feedback can include upcoming play selections or adjustments
in location and timing (Eccles and Tran, 2012). During a
competition, however, interpersonal coordination is usually not
based on guidance by one central authority (e.g., the coach).
Distracting noises, distance and rule restrictions can prevent
teams from being directed by external feedback. In such cases,
more distributed or decentralized communication channels
become important (Pedersen and Cooke, 2006; LeCouteur
and Feo, 2011; Passos et al., 2011; Seiler, 2014). In the
competitive setting of many team sports, a high physical
workload and, most importantly, time constraints impede
communication-based action regulation via closed feedback
loops (Cannon-Bowers and Bowers, 2006). Understanding
how coordination can nonetheless be achieved in these
situations is important. However, the reciprocal and dynamic
relationship between the social and individual factors involved
in interpersonal coordinative processes make it obvious that
human interaction in social contexts is among the most
complex challenges to scientific understanding (Vallacher
and Nowak, 1997; see also Birrer and Seiler, 2008; Duch
et al., 2010; Carron et al., 2012; McEwan and Beauchamp,
2014).
Various perspectives and empirical approaches have emerged
with which to explain interpersonal coordination in team
sports. Two of these approaches are central to this article.
The first is the concept of shared mental models (e.g.,
Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004;
Cannon-Bowers and Bowers, 2006). We refer to the second
approach as the ecological perspective. This perspective
highlights the importance of the information sources provided
by the environmental context within which a behavior is
performed (e.g., Araújo et al., 2006). This article begins
by outlining the general assumptions of both perspectives
and their associated criticisms. It then explains why both
offer indispensable information with which to understand
interpersonal coordination in sports teams and illustrates the
need for an integrative perspective. In our attempt to integrate
the central tenets of both these perspectives into a unified
view of interpersonal coordination in team sports, we borrow
from a theoretical outline of group action (Cranach et al.,
1986). We elaborate on this theoretical outline to integrate a
third perspective. This perspective focuses on the cognitive
constructive organization of the situational game context.
We argue that this third perspective is necessary to explain
interpersonal coordination in situations for which no shared
mental models are established and task situations that remain
ambiguous in terms of perceived affordances. A basketball
game sequence illustrates the theoretical considerations in an
applied example. The article ends with concluding remarks and
the implications of the presented perspective for research and
applied practice.
Theories of Shared Mental Models
Theories involving concepts of shared mental models are
rooted in a social-cognitive framework (Eccles and Tenenbaum,
2004, 2007). They build on the key tenet that the organization
of individual and team behavior involves knowledge-based
mental models (Rentsch and Davenport, 2006; Araújo and
Bourbousson, 2016). According to theories of shared mental
models, interpersonal coordination builds on individual
team members’ regulating their contributions based on inter-
individually shared ground. Sharedness, within this line of
research, has been referred to as the synergistic aggregation of
the team members’ mental functioning, especially in terms of
similarity and complementarity (Langan-Fox et al., 2004; see also
Levine et al., 1993; Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994; Hutchins,
1995; Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2000; Cooke et al.,
2003; Reimer et al., 2006; Stanton et al., 2006; Ward and Eccles,
2006). The development of shared mental models is assumed to
improve team performance by enabling nonverbal interactions
and implicit coordination (Cannon-Bowers and Bowers, 2006;
Rico et al., 2008; Blickensderfer et al., 2010; Cooke et al., 2013).
Overt interaction between the various team members thus
becomes redundant.
We focus on two factors that are believed to be involved when
shared mental models facilitate interpersonal coordination. The
first is the feeding forward of behavioral instructions for defined
game situations (Eccles, 2010). Plans (Schank and Abelson, 1977)
have often been mentioned in this connection. In team sports,
macrolevel plans refer to overall team plans and strategies (Eccles
and Tenenbaum, 2007). Microlevel plans include more detailed
information about the individual operations required in given
situations. Plays in American football are prototypical of plans at
themicrolevel of team operations (Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2007).
While microlevel plans further specify and confine behavior, they
too must be adapted to the characteristics of the situational game
context (Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2007; Macquet and Kragba,
2015; Gershgoren et al., 2016). We adopt the term “top-down”
to indicate that knowledge-based shared mental models feed
forward information that leads to interpersonal coordination.
In a questionnaire-based study investigating shared mental
models in ice hockey and handball teams, Giske et al. (2015)
found support for the existence of common attack patterns
specific to certain kinds of game constellations. Overall, however,
empirical sports studies using shared mental models remain
scarce (Gershgoren et al., 2013).
For team plans to feed forward behavioral instructions, they
must exist prior to the athletes’ involvement in specific game
situations. Because the situational game context is dynamic and
may often be unique in its configurational setting, pure reliance
on pre-existing and shared plans will not always be possible
(Araújo et al., 2006; Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2007; Cooke et al.,
2013; Silva et al., 2013). To account for this, theories of shared
mental models have posited more dynamic and implicit ways in
which multiple teammembers’ mental models can overlap in real
time (Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004; Blickensderfer et al., 2010;
Eccles, 2010; Eccles and Tran, 2012). Athletes are believed to
use incidentally shared knowledge of probabilities to attribute
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situational informers to changes in task requirements and team
members’ reactions to these (Ward andWilliams, 2003; Williams
and Ward, 2007; Eccles, 2010). The importance of multiple
athletes perceiving game situations and one another’s behaviors
in correct, anticipative and complementary ways is highlighted
(e.g., Reimer et al., 2006). Empirical support for the role of shared
knowledge in the implicit coordination in team sports has been
provided by Blickensderfer et al. (2010). These authors used the
degree to which teammates adjust their positioning with respect
to one another as an indicator of the teams’ implicit coordination.
They found that the degree of shared expectations of specific
doubles-partner responses was correlated with teams’ implicit
coordination during tennis matches.
Concerns have also been raised in regard to explaining
this kind of in-process coordination (Eccles and Tenenbaum,
2004) by means of shared mental models. Skepticism has
been expressed concerning the reduction of team coordination
processes to collective team member states (Bourbousson et al.,
2011; Gorman, 2014). Sharing a common perspective on specific
game situations is unlikely to occur due to differences in
knowledge, skill, history and position in physical space between
players (Cooke et al., 2013; see also Reimer et al., 2006;
Bourbousson et al., 2011, 2012; Macquet and Stanton, 2014).
The Ecological Perspective on Team
Coordination
The approaches that we have subsumed within the ecological
perspective share a focus on the environment in which team
members must coordinate their behavior. In a very general
sense, ecological perspectives stand in contrast with the idea of
team members selecting options from those stored in mental
models. Instead, ecological perspectives seek to show how
the environment contributes to the kinds of interactions that
occur between agents and their respective environments and to
understand the properties of the environment that affect action
and decision-making processes (Cutting, 1982; Greeno, 1994;
Araújo et al., 2006; Araújo and Davids, 2009; Fajen et al., 2009;
Vilar et al., 2012).We will adopt the term “bottom-up” to indicate
that information from the environment leads to interpersonal
coordination.
Gibson (1977) coined the ecological perspective by
introducing the concept of affordances. By definition, affordances
are opportunities to act that are directly perceivable in the
environment in the here and now. By building a dynamic
transactional system with their environment, athletes may
perceive the environment’s intrinsic meaning for behavior in
terms of the environment’s functional relationship to themselves
(Gibson, 1979; Araújo et al., 2006). Because this is assumed not
to require cognitive mediation, the role of mental models is
subordinated (Gibson, 1977; see also Greeno, 1994; Araújo et al.,
2006; Fajen et al., 2009).
The concept of affordances has been adopted to explain
interpersonal coordination in sports teams (Silva et al., 2013).
Here, the environment refers to the situational game context,
which continuously changes with the behavior of the team
members and their opponents. The situational game context thus
constantly lays out new temporary environments and constrains
the team members’ possibilities in terms of coordinating their
actions toward the achievement of performance goals from
moment to moment. For example, previous actions will impact
the options for moving on in the future. An inexact pass, a badly
chosen path on the playing field or inappropriate positioning
can all affect the options for action available at any given point
in time (Nitsch, 2009). The remaining options that afford ways
of approaching a team goal in common facilitate interpersonal
coordination in a bottom-up fashion (Araújo et al., 2006). Thus,
affordances are highlighted as the organizing elements that
continuously provide information about how team members
can coordinate within the situational game context (Fajen et al.,
2009).
Empirical support for the role of the situational game context
in decision making during interactive team sports has been
provided by Correia et al. (2012). Using a simulated 3 vs. 3 rugby
task, they found that gaps opening in particular running channels
in the defensive line influenced the ball carriers’ decisions to pass
to either Team Member 1 or Team Member 2 or run with the
ball. In a study analysing passing behavior in real-world soccer
competitions, Steiner et al. (2017) found that passes were affected
by the team members’ positioning relative to the ball carrier,
the openness of passing lanes leading to team members and the
teammembers’ degree of defensive coverage by opposing players.
The findings indicate the athletes’ recurring use of the same
perceptual information to make passing decisions.
We should mention that the guiding role of the situational
game context has also been emphasized in conjunction with
perspectives that do not explicitly restrict the relationships
between agents and their social context to perceptual means
(e.g., Gorman, 2014; McNeese et al., 2016). According to such
perspectives, the causal mechanisms of team coordination lie in
the dynamic process of team interaction (Gorman, 2014). This
dynamic process may include reciprocal communicative acts
between team members.
If athletes perceive multiple affordances within a situational
game context, this situational game context remains ambiguous,
and behavior is virtually unconstrained by the perceived
affordances (Cutting, 1982). Ecological perspectives have been
criticized as being unclear about how specific affordances
for interpersonal coordination are selected from a multitude
of possibilities (Norman, 1999; Beek, 2009; Nitsch, 2009).
Furthermore, the observation of two performers coordinating
their behaviors with one another does not clarify what the
perceived affordance was for either performer or what
information constrained the link between them (Araújo
and Bourbousson, 2016). To address these criticisms, it
has been proposed that the notion of people as agents in
ecological theories should not be reduced to the bare person-
environment relationship (Cutting, 1982; Nitsch, 2009).
Instead, the organizing principles of perception and situational
orientation should also be applied to the processes that operate
within the actors (Cutting, 1982; Greeno, 1994; Gobet, 1998;
Didierjean and Marmèche, 2005; Nitsch, 2009). For example,
rather than endorsing or rejecting the roles of cognition and
internal representations programmatically, Nitsch (2009) has
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called for specifying the conditions under which they might or
might not be useful. We will take up on this notion in Section
Elaborating on the Outline.
Illustrating the Need for an Integrative
Perspective
Lately, there has been a growing call for an integrative perspective
on interpersonal coordination. For example, McNeese et al.
(2016) state that individual and shared mental models are
important because not all actions in interdependent team sports
are directed by the environment. They argue for the necessity
of better integrating perspectives on shared mental models and
ecological perspectives to capitalize on the strengths of each in
the understanding of interpersonal coordination in sports teams.
Gorman (2014) states that a general theory of interpersonal
coordination should involve intention and knowledge on the
part of team members while also considering environmental
constraints as fundamental to interpersonal coordination (see
also Araújo et al., 2006; Pedersen and Cooke, 2006; Duarte et al.,
2012; Cooke et al., 2013).
To illustrate the need for an integrative perspective in the
context of team sports, one can recall how often strategies and
plans are discussed in practice sessions (Gershgoren et al., 2013;
Giske et al., 2015). Teams practice defensive behaviors, specific
strategic alignments in response to the opposing team’s behavior,
to near perfection. Offensive plays to be announced during
games are also rehearsed. This kind of pre-process coordination
(Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004, 2007), which builds up shared
mental models, is so omnipresent in team sports that excluding it
from a theory of interpersonal coordination will certainly result
in painting an incomplete picture. Furthermore, it is common
practice to rehearse specific modules of coordinated team
plays, which can be flexibly adapted to many game situations.
So-called “give-and-goes” are an example from basketball. In
a give-and-go, an athlete passes (gives) the ball to a team
member. The athlete then immediately runs (goes) to a new
spot to offer himself as an opportunity to pass the ball again
(Eccles and Groth, 2007). In soccer, players practice dynamically
positioning themselves in a triangular alignment. This way,
passing opportunities for the ball carrier can constantly be
maintained (Giske et al., 2015; for further examples, see Eccles
and Tran Turner, 2014).
On the other hand, a theory of interpersonal coordination
must incorporate the fact that coordination always occurs within
specific and sometimes unpredictable game contexts. Hence, the
role of the information provided by that situational game context
is paramount. Sometimes, athletes who are perceptually attuned
to their team and game contexts may be able to perceive these
contexts directly by means of the acts they afford. For example,
Fajen et al. (2009) point out how an open passing lane to a
team member affords a pass to this team member. At the same
time, passing lanes that are well-defended by opposing players
perceivably constrain passes (Steiner et al., 2017).
In this article, interpersonal coordination that is directed
by shared mental models or enabled by the perception of
affordances frames our integrative perspective. We argue that
team coordination is also established in situations for which
shared mental models are not established and situations in
which athletes cognitively process the information provided by
the situational game context. Indications that such situations
do occur in the context of team sports can be seen in a line
of qualitative research involving interview techniques such as
video-stimulated recall (e.g., Sève et al., 2005; Poizat et al., 2009;
Bourbousson et al., 2010, 2011, 2012). Video recordings of team
behavior in natural settings and verbalizations during post-match
interviews are used to understand how individuals construct
meaning in game situations. These retrospective verbalizations
indicate that in mental models, sharedness is not always achieved
(e.g., Poizat et al., 2009; Bourbousson et al., 2011, 2012).
They further indicate that athletes take into account multiple
situational factors, mobilize prior knowledge and combine these
to construct new knowledge about the situational game context
(Sève et al., 2005; Poizat et al., 2009; Bourbousson et al., 2011).
In the following sections, we will develop an integrative
perspective on interpersonal coordination in interactive team
sports. This integrative perspective has no intention of altering
or criticizing existing theories. Instead, team coordination
exclusively directed by shared mental models, as opposed to
that exclusively directed by the perception of affordances, will
serve as the theoretical poles of the integrative work. In Section
A Theoretical Outline of Group Action, we summarize the
theoretical outline of group action by Cranach et al. (1986),
which serves as a framework for our integrative perspective. The
outline views group action as both directed by team plans and
reactive to the situational game context. Thus, both top-down
and bottom-up processes play important roles in the regulation of
team behavior. In Section Elaborating on the Outline, we further
elaborate on Cranach et al.’s outline (1986) and explain how
interpersonal coordination can be established in situations that
do not fit either of the theoretical poles. Following Nitsch’s (2009)
call, we have considered the ways in which information from
the situational game context can contribute to the emergence
of interpersonally coordinated behavior in ways that go beyond
the information’s most direct link to agents via the perception
system. The roles of mental models in the subjective organization
of situational opportunities to co-act will therefore be discussed.
A THEORETICAL OUTLINE OF GROUP
ACTION
Cranach et al. (1986) consider teams to be self-active systems that
actively direct their behavior toward certain ends. The impact
of external factors (e.g., through the perception of situation-
specific information) is considered an integral part of directed
behavior. However, team action is not affected only by external
information. It is also instantaneously guided by internally stored
information (e.g., cognitively represented team plans). Thus,
perceptual and cognitive processes are both involved in the
system’s monitoring of external contexts and the steering of
behavior.
Cranach et al. (1986) argue that because it is based on
individual goal-directed behavior, team action possesses the
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same characteristics as individual action but is complemented
by additional features that stem from its social nature. These
additional features are communicative and cooperative processes
that become possible and necessary through the involvement of
multiple persons. Cranach et al.’s theoretical outline of group
action is built on four central components: the structure of
the task, the structure of the team, the information-processing
structure and the action execution.
The structure of the task and the structure of the team
are essential in defining the conditional framework for team
efficiency. For optimal performance, team and task structures
must be in accord with one another. Cranach et al. (1986)
define a task as a social demand that requires an actor to
act. For the most part, tasks are closely related to specific
ecological settings (e.g., a specific game situation). Insofar as
the task contains detailed information about goals and plans,
Cranach et al. speak of a task structure. By this definition,
task structures are not determined simply by the information
available in specific game situations. Instead, the information
available in the situational game context is complemented
with internalized scenarios, e.g., mental models that include
goals and goal-directed plans that are viable means of task
performance.
Team structures, on the other hand, are associated with
the formation of a team, including the assignment of all team
members to specific task-relevant functions and the relationships
between team members during their involvement in a single
interactive task. In some sports (e.g., sailing), the team structure is
clear because the team members’ roles are distinctly attributable
to a set of predefined subtasks. In most interactive sports,
however, general role assignments do not predefine specific
functions in all situations down to the last detail. Instead, the
required functions must be specified in relation to the constraints
of situational game contexts, which often appear at short notice.
Thus, team members must adapt their behavior according to the
current task structures.
The information processing structure, the third component of
the model, describes the processes underlying the teammembers’
adaptation to changing task structures. Team-action-related
information processing takes place at both the individual and
team levels. On the level of individual team members, the theory
considers cognitive information processing, which is viewed as
a unique instrument for the mental guidance of goal-directed
action.
Communicative processes complement cognitive information
processing in individuals. Cranach et al. (1986) refer to this
as information processing at the team level. Commands and
assisting calls represent the flow of information between team
members1. Moreover, the communication of an individual
perception can affect the situational orientation of the team2.
Cranach et al. also note that communication enables teams to
learn action schemata for future acts. This exactly corresponds
1Note the similarity to Cooke et al’s (2013) conceptualization of interactive team
cognition.
2Note the similarity to the concept of shared situation awareness (e.g., Macquet,
2016).
to the kind of pre-process coordination referred to by Eccles and
Tenenbaum (2004, 2007).
The model’s fourth component is action execution. Team
behavior consists of individual acts and social execution.
Appropriately executed andmutually coordinated individual acts
allow interpersonal coordination to emerge at the team level.
Cranach et al. (1986) argue that individual action is organized
along three dimensions: hierarchy, sequence and complexity.
While the authors explain the dimensions’ relevance to individual
acts, we will later illustrate how the same dimensions can
be considered as organizing dimensions of interpersonally
coordinated team behavior.
Finally, Cranach et al. (1986) argue that groups often perform
within equifinal task situations (Heider, 1958). Equifinality refers
to the fact that the completion of complex team tasks is
usually not restricted to one unique solution. Instead, many
potential paths conceivably allow attaining the same goal (see also
Oesterreich, 1981). This flexibility can be advantageous because it
enables teams to approach given requirements in light of existing
team abilities. On the downside, equifinality complicates the
emergence of interpersonal coordination because it increases the
degrees of freedom. Furthermore, the behavior of opposing teams
becomes more unpredictable.
ELABORATING ON THE OUTLINE
To elaborate on our view of the involvement of internal
information in the subjective construction and organization
of the information provided by the situational game context,
we adapt and extend Cranach et al.’s (1986) ideas. We will
discuss two factors we consider central in regard to this internal
information: organizational rules and the contents of mental
models.
Organizational Rules
In order to explain how situational opportunities for
interpersonally coordinated team behavior are established
through a team member’s interaction with a situational
game context, we adopt Cranach et al.’s (1986) notion of
the three-dimensional organization of action and apply it to
the organization of interpersonally coordinated team action.
Because it is directed toward the attainment of primary team
goals, individual behavior requires reactive adjustment to the
situational game context and constant (re-)organization along
hierarchical, sequential and complex dimensions. While all
three dimensions of action organization supposedly act in
combination, we will briefly explain their features separately.
The hierarchical aspect of team action organization refers to
monitoring a situation’s functional relationship to the attainment
of the primary goals that are currently directing behavior. From
an athlete’s point of view, this includes determining a situation’s
offerings in regard to the highest task goals, which provide the
athlete’s directional perspective (Araújo et al., 2006; see also
Klein et al., 2007; Nitsch, 2009). In team sports, this directional
perspective is set out by the general rules of the specific sport.
If the main objective is to score more points than the opposing
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team, then scoring points and preventing opponents from doing
so define the two goals that direct behavior at the highest level
of the hierarchy. The team must adopt a structure (e.g., assign
functions to team members) and perform behaviors that are
optimally suited to attaining these goals.
During task performance, the situational constraints
organized by the opposing team may block instant paths to the
primary goal of scoring. Consequently, situational game contexts
must be monitored concerning the sequentially and complexly
organized goal approximations they allow. Preparatory steps,
such as bringing the ball to a shooting position nearer to the
target, become necessary (Oesterreich, 1981). These preparatory
steps give rise to subgoals at lower levels of the hierarchy.
Subgoals are abandoned when achieved and then replaced by
those that follow in the sequential alignment toward higher-order
goals (Wilensky, 1983). If the situational game context changes in
a way that enables a more direct path to higher-order goals, then
temporary subgoals may be abandoned before they have been
reached (Oesterreich, 1981). The relationship between lower-
and higher-level goals determines the hierarchical-sequential
organization of team behavior (Volpert, 1982; Cranach et al.,
1986; Marks et al., 2001; see also Hacker, 2005).
The dimension of complexity complements the goal-directed
organization of team behavior. We extend Cranach et al.’s
(1985, 1986) use of the term (they use it to describe multiple
simultaneously performed acts of a single individual, e.g., moving
one’s head and feet) and use it to refer to the simultaneous
behavior of multiple team members (see also Marks et al., 2001).
The dimension of complexity in organizing team action refers
to perceiving or creating opportunities to co-act with others.
Simply put, it is relevant in relation to the question, “Can I
attain a current action goal by myself?” When the answer is
no, this dimension of action organization becomes relevant. Let
us assume a team is in possession of the ball and striving to
position itself to attempt to shoot. The ball carrier brings the
ball down the wing. He monitors the situation for potential
pass receivers because he plans to play a cross to bring the ball
closer to the goal. At the same time, some players are running to
position themselves in the box. They have seen the ball carrier
and anticipate an opportunity to complement his efforts. This
must occur simultaneously with the person who has the ball
looking for a position from which he can play a cross-court pass.
Another example is a through ball, in which case the intended
receiver of a pass should be underway by the time the ball is
kicked to the future point of reception.
We argue that the monitoring of the situational game context
in regard to these three dimensions is part of a subjective,
constructive process that enables interpersonally coordinated
team behavior in situations with no shared mental models and
no or no unambiguous affordances.
Mental Representations in the
Specification of Situational Context
When monitoring the situational game context, athletes may
need to rely on mental models (internal information). Numerous
examples of mental models assumed to be relevant in the
domain of team sports have been provided: plans and patterns
of coordination (Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004, 2007; Macquet,
2009; Macquet and Kragba, 2015), specific behavioral programs,
scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977), and mental models about
other team members (Annett, 1996; Rentsch and Davenport,
2006; Gershgoren et al., 2013), to name only a few (Rouse et al.,
1992; Reimer et al., 2006; see also Eccles and Groth, 2007).
To illustrate the contribution of mental models to the
monitoring of the situational game context and the subjective
construction of opportunities to act, we will consider mental
models about other team members. Such mental models have
been defined as consisting of, among other things, knowledge
about the specific strengths and weaknesses of other team
members (Annett, 1996; Reimer et al., 2006; Rentsch and
Davenport, 2006; Gershgoren et al., 2013). In team sports,
team members are part of the situational game context and
represent perceivable external information. An athlete’s mental
models, MEMBER A and MEMBER B, of her Team Members
A and B enable the inclusion of additional information in
the situational game context. The mental models themselves
need not include other situational factors. While such mental
models are restricted in terms of content, they are useful in
various game contexts because they are flexibly transferable
to various situations and can be combined with other mental
models (Macquet, 2009; Macquet and Kragba, 2015). If the
mental model MEMBER A includes information about the
excellent technical skills of TeamMember A, then TeamMember
A will be considered a potential pass receiver in numerous
game situations (Johnson, 2006). Team Member A’s status as a
potential passing opportunity is thus characterized by a certain
level of stability. However, this status is not a permanent
attribute of Team Member A. Instead, it also depends on other
situational features. If Team Member A is being defended well,
the extent to which she represents a passing opportunity requires
reappraisal, considering both her abilities (included in MEMBER
A) and her current defensive coverage (information provided
by the situational game context). In combination, these various
sources of information determine a team member’s current
state as a passing opportunity. According to representational
theories of the mind, team members can combine a large but
finite number of mental models in numerous ways to create
increasingly complex mental models (Margolis and Laurence,
2007). Similarly, we propose thatmental models can be combined
with external information sources in numerous ways to specify
the constraints and opportunities within increasingly complex
game contexts. Thus, opportunities to act may be detectable
because of the highly elaborate mental model that agents hold of
the current situational game context (e.g., a specified team plan
to be followed in the given situation). However, athletes may also
detect opportunities to act when localizing specific information
sources that appear as subcomponents of a complex situational
game context (e.g., a team member standing open).
Referring to the great importance Cranach et al. (1986)
placed on the above-mentioned structures in understanding
interpersonally coordinated team behavior, Seiler (2014)
categorizes mental models according to their relatedness to task
structure(s), team structure(s), intrateam communication and
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cooperation. In our example, we will adopt this proposal. We
want to stress that the content assigned to one of these four
structures is not always clear-cut and that the categories are by
no means terminal.
Mental models that relate to task structure can include the
macro-environment of a specific sport. This term refers to the
general framework provided by the rules of the sport (Kaminski,
2009). Athletes must constrain their actions to this specific
framework. Mental models that are linked to individual and
role-specific tasks have much in common with the concept of
taskwork knowledge (McIntyre and Salas, 1995).
Mental models that relate to group structure may include the
positioning and strategic alignment of team members, formal
role assignments, roles that are established by means of team
members’ task-relevant strengths and weaknesses and informal
roles (e.g., Annett, 1996; Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004; Rentsch
and Davenport, 2006; Gershgoren et al., 2013).
Mental models related to team communication may refer to
communicative signs that announce specific plays. They may also
include hand signals indicating a player’s availability to receive
a pass. Teams often use dedicated signs to inform one another
about planned moves (Eccles, 2010; Macquet and Kragba, 2015).
Because communication in interactive team sports is often visible
to all, attempts to conceal information from the opponent include
special communication systems and signs. Teammembers with a
common history in sports may have developed mental models
of one another’s behavioral idiosyncrasies. This helps players
to “read” their team members by using nonverbal channels of
communication (e.g., Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004).
Mental models related to interpersonal coordination have
much in common with the concept of teamwork knowledge
(McIntyre and Salas, 1995; Bowers et al., 1997; Eccles and
Tenenbaum, 2004). These models include information about
how the actions of multiple individuals can be successfully
integrated to produce group-level performance. Overall team
tactics, game plans and scripts for specific situational game
contexts are examples of this (Rentsch and Davenport, 2006).
These models can also refer to plans with various levels of detail
(Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2007). They may be taught explicitly
(e.g., through coaching) or developed based on experience in real
game situations (Annett, 1996; Eccles, 2010).
AN EXAMPLE FROM BASKETBALL
Figure 1 exemplifies the involvement of mental models in
the subjective specification of the situational game context.
The scenes present an offensive situation in basketball. They
include three chronologically ordered frames that illustrate
the evolving game. The three frames highlighted in gray
illustrate the game situation as it objectively presents itself
to the observer. The figure further includes four levels that
indicate the mental models involved in the constructive
organization of the situational game context. These levels
refer to mental models of the task structure, team structure,
communication and coordination. The example illustrates how
such models could be involved in specifying information from
the situational game context and organizing the situation
to reveal opportunities for interpersonally coordinated team
behavior. It further shows how situation-related mental models
(internal information) and perceptual or communicational
(external) information can be integrated according to the
hierarchical, sequential and complex dimensions of action
organization.
In the initial frame, all athletes have taken their positions, as
defined by the team’s formation (this refers to the feed-forward
function of shared mental models). The offensive team is shown
in black, and the defense is shown in white. In basketball, the
primary goal of the team in possession of the ball is to score
baskets (a). All team members share this group goal and use it
to direct their behavior on a global level (e.g., Reimer et al., 2006;
Wieber et al., 2012). The point guard (Black #1) is in possession
of the ball. Situational constraints prevent him from attaining the
primary task goal directly. Often, these constraints are created
by opponents who attempt to neutralize the goal-directed efforts
of their adversaries. In the current example, the tight defense
created by the guard’s direct opponent (White #1) does not allow
a promising attempt at a long-distance shot. Moreover, three
other opponents (White #2, #3, #4) are ready to back upDefender
1 if the point guard attempts to get past him and penetrate into
the zone (b). Preparatory steps are required to approximate the
hierarchically higher goal sequentially. The team’s behavior is
directed toward scoring a basket, but in this case, it is adapted
to the situational constraints and (re-)organized in a hierarchic
and sequential order.
Guided by the newly adopted approximation goal of preparing
a shooting possibility for the team, the situation offers the
guard three options in terms of passing the ball to a team
member (c, d and e). All three options could potentially lead to
scoring a basket. This indicates the task situation’s equifinality.
In choosing one option, mental models about the other team
players come into play (f and g). The point guard knows that
both the shooting guard (Black #2) and the small forward (Black
#3) have high field goal percentage from behind the three-
point line. Based on his knowledge about his team members,
no option emerges as being superior to the other. Passing
the ball to either of them will enable an equally good goal
approximation. The shooting guard’s defender (White #2) is
located at the high post. This leaves enough room for a direct
pass to the shooting guard. The shooting guard’s skills, in
combination with the loose defense of his opponent, become
integrated into a contextual opportunity to pass him the ball.
Simultaneously, the center (Black #5) takes his position and
calls for the ball by raising his arm (h). Passing the ball to the
center directly is not an option, because of the long distance
involved, combined with a bad passing angle. Instead, delivering
the ball to the center via the shooting guard is more favorable.
In the current situation, the right side of the playing field offers
the point guard better options to act in a goal-directed manner
(i and j).
In the second frame, the point guard directs his behavior
toward moving the ball to the right side. The shooting guard does
not reciprocate the point guard’s eye contact (k). This perceptual
information warns the point guard that a pass might reach the
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FIGURE 1 | Three-frame sequence of an evolving basketball game situation. Annotations in the text.
shooting guard unexpectedly and thus be risky (e.g., Macquet
and Kragba, 2015). Hence, the point guard starts to dribble the
ball toward the shooting guard (k). The point guard’s defender
(White #1) follows closely and still does not allow the shooting
guard to shoot the ball or penetrate into the zone. As in the first
frame, the search for indirect paths to the primary goal remains
necessary. The actions and reactions of the various players cause
local changes in the task constraints. As the guard moves toward
the right side of the playing field, the defenders of the shooting
guard and the center (White #2 and #5, respectively) decrease
their distances from their direct opponents. They do so to make
passes from the point guard to their directly opposing players
more difficult. As a consequence, the previous opportunities to
pass (i and j) become less likely to lead to achieving the task
goal. Meanwhile, the power forward (Black #4) has set a screen
(m) for the athlete defending the small forward (White #3). This
screen is not part of a predefined play calling for specific action
by the whole team. However, it is a behavior module that can be
flexibly adapted to many game situations. Once initiated, those
who perceive it understand the steps of the behavior module.
The small forward (Black #3) has recognized the opportunity
created and taken it to put some distance between himself and
his defender. He runs away from the zone to take a position
behind the three-point line. He signals his readiness to receive
the ball by putting out his hands toward the point guard (n).
The point guard perceives the open team member as a passing
affordance (o).
In the third frame, the point guard plays the corresponding
pass (p). Immediately after receiving the ball, the small forward
(Black #3) takes a jump shot (q). As the ball leaves the small
forward’s hands, a task transition begins. For a short time, the
team task is undefined at the level of the primary task goal.
If the ball falls into the basket, the primary task goal changes
from scoring a basket to preventing the opponents from scoring
a basket. If, however, the attempt is not successful, then there
may be a chance to regain possession of the ball via offensive
rebounding. By calling out that his shot will be off-target (r),
the small forward informs his teammates that there will be an
opportunity for an offensive rebound. The team’s predetermined,
shared strategy mandates that both the power forward (Black #4)
and the center (Black #5) go for the offensive rebound (s), while
the guard and the small forward will run back up the floor to
prevent a fast break (t).
This three-frame sequence depicts a short excerpt of a
basketball game. It illustrates how mental models shared by the
entire team feed forward into behavioral guidelines; this refers
to a top-down process. At the same time, it illustrates how
information from the situational game context is used to detect
opportunities to carry out specific behaviors and thus help to
regulate and coordinate team behavior in the process. The pass
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from the point guard to the open small forward (o) was triggered
by the perception of a passing affordance; this is a bottom-up
process. The sequence further illustrates how mental models
(internal information), in interaction with (external) information
sources, enable the assignment of subjective meanings to the
situational game context in a modular and constructive manner.
The involvement of mental models in specifying subjective
opportunities to (inter)act has primarily been illustrated from the
perspective of the point guard (Black #1) and the small forward
(Black #3). We suppose that the same process of subjectively
specifying a situational game context takes place for all team
members. According to this view, interpersonal coordination is
enabled when multiple subjective perspectives on the situational
game context are constructed congruently, complementarily
or reactively (e.g., Eccles and Tenenbaum, 2004; Rentsch and
Davenport, 2006; Bourbousson et al., 2011). An example of
congruency is the common adoption of the same goals or
subgoals, which provides overall direction for personal behavior.
An example of reactive complementarity can be seen in the small
forward taking advantage of the screen the power forward has
set. He reacts to the overt behavior of his team member, which
signals the initiation of a specific module of a coordinated team
play (give-and-go), and adapts his own behavior to it (Macquet
and Kragba, 2015).
In the chosen example, the point guard and small forward do
not share the same plans to guide their behavior from Frame
1 through Frame 3. While the entire team shares the same
primary goal, the pass from the point guard to the small forward
is an example of team coordination being established locally,
without the entire team sharing a mental model of the current
game situation (see Bourbousson et al., 2012). The situation
is characteristically different after the shooting attempt. Now,
all team members adapt their behavior to a shared mental
plan because everyone assumes their roles as defined by the
game strategy for this kind of situation. This example illustrates
interpersonal coordination as it is based on the goal-directed
adaptation of multiple individuals to situational game contexts.
It exemplifies how top-down, bottom-up, and constructivist
regulation mechanisms are all involved in this process.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Interpersonal coordination in interactive sports is a complex
phenomenon. Several streams of research approach it from
different perspectives. The present article builds on the important
contributions some of these approaches have made and aims
to integrate and position them within a theoretical framework.
This framework borrows from the theoretical outline of group
action proposed by Cranach et al. (1986). According to this
outline, group behavior regulated by shared team plans is an
example of team behavior being directed from the top down
via a team-level construct. Team behavior that emerges from
athletes perceiving situational affordances is an example of how
group behavior is reactive to the situational game context and is
thus regulated from the bottom up. We extend the framework
by integrating a perspective on the subjective construction of
the situational game context. This constructivist perspective
accounts for interpersonal coordination as it may be established
in novel situations, for which teams do not share mental models.
It further accounts for interpersonal coordination in situations
with multiple perceived affordances or situations to which
athletes are not sufficiently attuned in order to act based on
perceived affordances. We argue that under such circumstances,
opportunities for interpersonally coordinated team behavior are
constructed based on the hierarchical, sequential and complex
dimensions of group action organization. We further illustrate
how mental models may be involved in this constructive process.
For illustrative purposes, we have categorized mental models
according to the four structures presented by Cranach et al.
(1986). This categorization’s primary purpose is to delineate the
dynamic integration of multiple mental models as they connect
with a given game situation. We want to stress that the categories
are exemplary. Finally, an example illustrates how top-down,
bottom-up and constructivist processes may simultaneously
enable interpersonal coordination.
The integrative perspective’s primary implication for research
is that a search for the one regulation mechanism in the
coordination of sports teams is not productive. It argues
for following various approaches to better understand the
coordination of interpersonal behavior. Provided that multiple
mechanisms are involved in enabling interpersonal coordination,
one general implication for research is the need to understand
in what situations and to what degree they are involved. Hence,
designs that estimate the mechanisms’ relative contributions to
interpersonal coordination in various game contexts are needed.
In our basketball example, the point guard’s consideration to
pass the ball to the shooting guard is based on both information
provided by the situational game context (the shooting guard
standing open) and his mental model of the shooting guard’s
shooting skills.When studying basketballers’ real-world behavior,
every team member without the ball (all representing potential
passing opportunities) can be described by his relative position
on the playing field. Perceptual information as available from the
subjective perspective of the ball carrier can be quantified (e.g.,
Steiner and Kunz, 2017). Furthermore, each teammember can be
assigned values that indicate aspects of the ball carrier’s mental
models about these particular team members. For example, a
high value could indicate that the ball carrier’s mental model of
this team members is one of a highly skilled shooter. Finally,
each team member can be described in terms of the passing
priority he is given by a team’s playing strategy for this kind of
situation. Coding passes dichotomously (the player receiving the
balls is coded “1,” and all disregarded team members are coded
“0”), the effects of the variables representing the information
provided by the situational game context, mental models about
other teammembers and shared team strategies can be estimated
using logistic regression analyses (e.g., Steiner and Kunz, 2017).
Similar tests could be conducted using experimental designs.
In virtual reality settings, the space available to the shooting guard
can be manipulated (e.g., Correia et al., 2012). The skill-level of
the player in the shooting guard position can be manipulated by
showing team members with different levels of shooting ability.
Finally, this manipulation can be performed in situations for
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which teams do and do not have predefined team strategies. Using
three gradations for both available space and shooting skills, the
experimental manipulation results in a 3 × 3 × 2 design to test
the relative effects of available space (information provided by the
situational game context), shooting skills (mental models about
other team members) and shared team strategies.
Based on our integrative perspective, we hypothesize that
passing decisions are affected by the spatial properties of
the situational game context, athletes’ mental models of team
members and shared team plans. Testing each effect in isolation,
we thus expect to find higher probabilities for passes to spatially
less constrained team members, higher probabilities for passes
to team members who are mentally represented as having better
shooting skills, and higher probabilities for passes that are in
accord with pre-defined team plans. When testing the effects
simultaneously, we would, for example, expect larger effects on
the part of spatial constraints on passing decisions when no
team plans are available than when team plans are available.
Furthermore, we expect that the effect of prioritizing passes to
more-skilled team members will decrease as passes to more-
skilled members become spatially constrained.
With regard to practical applications, the integrative
perspective implies that there are multiple paths to interpersonal
coordination. According to the provided perspective, shared
team plans and strategies are an important pillar of interpersonal
coordination. Coaches should enable this kind of pre-process
coordination. The fact that it will not be possible to pre-define
shared team plans for every kind of situation encountered does
not lower their importance in all those situations for which
they can be established. A second implication is that coaches
should tell their athletes that there will be situations for which
no pre-defined team plans are available. Preparing athletes for
this kind of unpreparedness could include instructing them to
look for the specific opportunities available in given situations
(rather than losing time attempting to remember a non-existent
plan). A third implication is the need to clearly communicate
team goals. According to the organizing rules discussed, primary
goals help athletes integrate the available information sources to
make sense of the situational game context. Clarifying team goals
enables a common denominator in this subjective organization
of situational game contexts. Whether the team goal is to play
aggressively or to play safely makes a difference in regard to the
athletes’ perspective on the game. Finally, the framework posits
that athletes profit from the information they are given prior to
the game. The information could include the specific strengths,
prioritized running paths or defensive weaknesses of opponents.
This information enables mental models athletes can associate
with external information in real time to actively construct their
perspective on the situational game context.
To conclude, we have examined the integrative perspective in
relation to recent investigations on briefing and debriefing in elite
sports. According to Macquet et al. (submitted), head coaches
prepare their players by transmitting the game plan to them
and providing them with information about their opponents
(i.e., strengths, weaknesses, behavioral tendencies, and specific
opponents to survey). This information enables team members
to share team plans and establish knowledge that can be used
to flexibly construct a subjective perspective on the situational
game context during the course of the game. Furthermore,
coaches teach team-sport players what to look for (Macquet et al.,
2015). They guide the players’ perceptions and enable them to
perceive meaningful information. This guidance helps players
read the game and better coordinate with their teammates and
opponents. In our view, these findings support the presented
integrative perspective. They indicate that the integrative
perspective may represent a greater challenge to empirical
science than to applied work. Research attempts to describe
and explain the principles underlying interpersonal coordination
via scientific means. This includes various approaches that may
not always enable a common perspective on the phenomenon
in question. In our integrative perspective, these various
approaches do not strive for exclusiveness or general superiority.
Combined, they contribute to a better understanding of a
common focus: interpersonal coordination within interactive
team sports.
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